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ABSTRACT
Privacy issues were raised in the process of training deep learning in
medical, mobility, and other elds. To solve this problem, we want
to present privacy-preserving distributed deep learning method
that allow clients to learn a variety of data without direct exposure.
We divided a single deep learning architecture into a common
extractor, a cloud model and a local classier for the distributed
learning. First, the common extractor, which is used by local clients,
extracts secure features from the input data. e secure features
also take the role that the cloud model can employ various task
and diverse types of data. e feature contain the most important
information that helps to proceed various task. Second, the cloud
model including most parts of the whole training model gets the
embedded features from the massive local clients, and performs
most of deep learning operations which takes severe computing
cost. Aer the operations in cloud model nished, outputs of the
cloud model send back to local clients. Finally, the local classier
determined classication results and delivers the results to local
clients. When clients train models, our model does not directly
expose sensitive information to exterior network. During the test,
the average performance improvement was 1.11% over the existing
local training model. However, in a distributed environment, there
is a possibility of inversion aack due to exposed features. For this
reason, we experimented with the common extractor to prevent
data restoration. e quality of restoration of the original image was
tested by adjusting the depth of the common extractor. As a result,
we found that the deeper the common extractor, the restoration
score decreased to 89.74.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Deep learning has shown many outstanding performances in many
elds such as image analysis [1, 10, 17], signal analysis [12, 22], and
others. e successes of deep learning come from the huge amounts
of accessible data. Because some data can intrude the privacy of
individuals, even some is too sensitive, not all data can be shared for
the deep learning. ese personal data-related issues cause people
to worry about privacy breaches. In order to solve these problems,
Shokri et al. present deep learning learning algorithms that com-
municate between clients and servers without directly exposing
data and receive and learn global parameters to ensure privacy of
individuals [23]. Since the presentation of Federated learning, stud-
ies have been conducted on how to incorporate weights learned
from clients. Among them, McMahan et al presented the feder-
ated averaging algorithm for sharing model weight of each client
when conducting federated guidance [3]. Also, Zhu and Jin propose
modied SET algorithm for weight update of federated learning
model [32]. To enhance the security of existing federated ordering
structures, Bonawitz et al added secure aggregation in the middle to
calculate the weights to be updated in other spaces and send them
back to the cloud [2]. Application studies using Federated learn-
ing include the mobile keyboard pre-diction algorithm presented
by Hard et al. [8] and architecture and applications for the feder-
ated learning framework presented by Yang et al [29]. Federated
learning presupposes learning from each client. However, it can be
dicult to utilize when clients do not have sucient computing
power. e split learning algorithm, which allows the cloud server
to bear most of the computations instead of these clients, was pre-
sented by Vepakomma et al [27]. Further research has presented
security issues and solutions arising from Split learning [26].
Federated learning and split learning are algorithms that eventu-
ally learn the same tasks. On the other hand, Caruana’s proposed
Multitask learning makes it possible to perform several tasks [4].
Several studies have been conducted since Multitask learning was
presented. Sener et al present multi-task leading algorithm for
multi-objective optimization [21]. Kendall et al presented an algo-
rithm for learning three dierent tasks: semantic segmentation,
instance segmentation, and depth estimation [11]. Liu et al present
an end-to-end model for learning segmentation and depth estima-
tion [13]. Multitask learning has shown some performance, but has
the potential for security issues. Multitask leading has shown some
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performance, but has the potential for security issues. For that rea-
son, the multi-task leading algorithm with federated leading was
studied. Smith et al presented MOCHA [24], a multi-task leading
algorithm with federated learning, and Corinzia and Buhmann pre-
sented a federated multi-task leading algorithm called VIRTURAL
[5].
ere are several researches [7, 31, 34] to aack the foremen-
tioned distributed learning systems. Fredrikson et al. aacked the
split learning by reconstruting the input images only using the
embedded features, not any other input related information [7].
Yang et al. and Zhu et al. aacked the federated learning by recon-
structing the input images from the gradients, which are owing
through the model during backpropagation. Due to the severe com-
petition between hiding and seeking the private information, fully
encrypted deep learning systems are not exist at present. We pro-
pose split learning based multiple classication learning, which also
can be aacked by inversion aacks. To infer the reconstruction we
increased the depth of embedding models, and also increased the
proportion of non-linear function in the feature extracting layers.
In this paper, we propose a learning method in which personal
privacy is guaranteed and information can be shared with other
clients while also utilizing the resources of the cloud. Our model
is largely divided into three parts. Two parts are computed on a
local computer, and only the other part is computed on a cloud
server. On the local computer, common extractor and local classi-
er are trained. Unlike the existing distributed learning method,
our model receives input data with dierent types and forms for
various task. So, our model makes standardized features through
common extractor. In contrast, cloud models are trained in cloud
servers. e cloud model receives the standardized feature from
the common extractor, than the cloud model outputs processed
feature. Finally, e processed feature sent to local classier. In
this distributed environment which split local part and cloud part,
only forward feature and backward gradient values are transmied
and received, which keep our system secured from malicious at-
tackers. We assumed 3 clients and used Cifar10 to learn the model.
Each client will perform model learning through cloud computing
without exposing the original data through the built model. For
this reason, each client’s original data can be studied without being
exposed directly.
2 RELATEDWORK
2.1 Distributed deep learning
Federated learning has been proposed to address privacy issues
arising from data learning [23]. Federated learning is a learning
method in which personal data with privacy problems are learned
in each individual’s local computer, collected learning results from
cloud servers, and then re-distributed them into a single model.
At this time, how to combine the models of the local client has a
signicant impact on performance. For this reason, studies have
been conducted on whether to increase the performance of a single
combined model by integrating the model weight or gradient values
for each local [3, 6, 18, 28, 33].
Federated learning is a great advantage that it can contribute
to model learning without exposing sensitive privacy data of indi-
viduals. However, the problem exists that local clients should use
only the performance of their personal computers entirely. Split
learning was proposed to reduce the burden of computing on these
individuals [27]. Split learning is a method of performing part of
the model’s training operations on cloud servers. erefore, split
learning reduces the burden of computing on local clients and al-
lows them to train heavy models eciently. However, because
part of the training is performed on cloud servers, split learning
has the potential to expose relevant information during training.
erefore, an algorithm was presented to prevent the restoration
of the information using the gradient value or feature information
transmied [26].
2.2 Multi-task learning
Most models are trained to perform only one task. Multitask leading
is presented to overcome these limitations [4]. Multitask learning is
mainly used in two ways: hard parameter sharing and so parame-
ter sharing [19]. e hard parameter sharing method learns about
dierent tasks, but shares the same weight in the beginning and
later has dierent weights. Conversely, the so parameter sharing
method only shares training information with dierent weights. In
addition, Deep Relationship Networks [14], Full-Adaptive Feature
Sharing [15], Cross-stitch Networks [16], Low Supervision [25], A
Point Many-Task Model [9], Weighting loss with certication [11],
Tensor factory for MTL [30], and Fluice Networks [20] training
methods exist.
2.3 Inversion attack
Numerous methods for privacy preserving deep learning (PPDL)
have been proposed [3, 23, 27]. Most widely used methods such as
Federated learning [3, 23] and split learning [27] don’t share raw
data for the privacy, though training deep learning model requires
input data. Instead, embedded features or gradients, which were
believed as safe, are shared to train deep learning models. However,
Fredrikson et al. developed an inversion aack which reconstruct
an input image from the embedded features [7]. Simply placing
decoder models, which have inverted structures of trained model, to
embedded features reconstruct input images by optimizing decoder
model’s parameters can successfully inverting the training model’s
parameters. Furthermore, Yang et al. reconstruct input images only
using somax results. ese results indicate sharing embedded
features or somax results is still exposed to inversion aacks [31].
Because split learning [27] shared embedded features to the cloud
server, the split learning is still exposed to reconstruction aacks.
Zhu et al. aacks federated learning by reconstructing the input im-
ages only from leaked gradients during back-propagation process
[34]. To reconstruct input image, aacker place gaussian noise as
parameters. e aackers optimized the gaussian noises to become
similar with gradients leaked from the original training processes.
Aer the optimization, the optimized parameters show extremely
similar gures with the original image, which poses severe danger
in federated learning. Due to the inversion aacks, distributed deep
learning systems needs to pay aention to developing reliable pro-
cess for training and validating deep learning models. Our research
relieve the reconstruction danger by making feature extracting
layers deeper by adding non-linear functions such as convolution,
max pooling and rectied linear unit (ReLU).
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Figure 1: Distributed deep learning model structure. is model is divided into the local client compute part and the cloud
server compute part. erefore, the original training data is not exposed to the outside world, and only forward features and
backward gradient are sent and received.
3 METHOD
3.1 Distributed deep learning
e distributed deep learning system was built with one cloud
server, more than two local clients. e cloud server will be the
largest part of the model training. And the local trains the rest of
the model that except the cloud server’s part. so the computational
burden is relatively low. e distributed deep learning system is
largely divided into Common Extractor, Cloud Model, and Local
Classier. First, the entire local client will share a neural network
called common extractor. erefore, local clients share the weights
of some of the training models. is shared neural network is
learned knowledge about various feature. For this reason, the
common extractor analyze important information more than non-
shared neural network. Second, e cloud server is responsible for
most model training except common extractor and classier. In
other words, the cloud server will cover a large operation in overall
model learning, and the client will have a relatively small operation.
If clients want to pay aention to privacy, they can increase the
extent to which the common extractor pays for the entire model.
However, this entails an increase in the computational burden
that must be borne locally. Finally, the local classier includes the
model’s last fully connected layer.
Local clients who want to learn through cloud servers send
training requests to the cloud. Aer local clients request training
to the server, each client inputs their own training data into the
same initialized common extractor. e common extractor outputs
features of the input data and then sends them to the cloud model.
Since clients use the common extractor, the cloud model receives
feature with standardized shape from the common extractor and
send a cloud model feature to local classier as output. Finally,
the result from classier is compared with ground true to obtain
the loss value. Aer this forward propagation, backpropagation is
performed through the loss value. e backpropagation direction is
reversed by forward propagation and transmits the gradient value.
When the entire local client has completed one epoch training,
obtain the average weight for the common extractor of the local
clients which have learned with dierent data. en update all
common extractors to the average weight. Aer the weight of the
common extractor is updated, the models of the local client and
cloud server continue the training again.
3.2 Inversion attack using embedded features
Inversion aacks reconstruct input image only using the partial
information such as embedded features or gradient ows. Because
our distributed deep learning system follow the split learning struc-
tures [27], reconstructing input images from the embedded features
can be problematic. Inversion aack proposed by Yang et al. recon-
structed input images from the embedded features successfully by
simply adding the decoder model, which has inverted structures of
original embedding layers (Fig. 2) [31].
y = д(f (x)), x ∈ R3 (1)
x ′ = f ′(f (x)), x ∈ R3 (2)
In Fig. 1 show split learning process for training classication
model. Input images pass through the embedding layers f (·), and
the embedded features f (x) are shared with the centralized server
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Figure 2: Outline of the inversion attacks which applied to the split learning.
for training classier д(·). However, when the aackers aach
decoder f ′(·) to the embedded features, input image can be recon-
structed. e decoder has inverted structures of embedding layers,
and through the repetitive training of decoder embedded features
can be inverted to input images successfully. For example, convolu-
tion layer in embedding layers can be inverted with the transpose
convolution layer, and ReLU activation function can be inverted
with tanh function.
4 EXPERIMENT
4.1 Distributed deep learning
4.1.1 Experimental design.
To evaluate the performance of the distributed learning model, We
used the mnist, cifar10 and imagenet dataset as training data for
distributed environment models. Since we assumed three local
clients, we proceeded by distributing the data to each local client.
In this experiment, we distributed class data from 0 to 3 to local
client1, class data from 4 to 6 to local client2, and class data from 7
to 9 to local client3.
And for the training model, the distributed learning model was
built by partitioning the ResNet50. To check the impact on the
depth of the common extractor, we proceeded with the training by
changing the depth of the common extractor. In this experiment,
we set common extractor from input to layer1 in experiment1,
from input to layer2 in experiment 2, and from input to layer3 in
experiment 3.
We wrote the python code for the experiment using pytorch.
Dierent training parameters were used for each data training. First
of all, when using mnist as training data, the epoch size is 20, batch
number is 200, and the leading rate is 0.001. Secondly, when cifar10
is used as training data, the epoch size is 200 and the batch number
is 200 is 0.1. irdly, when the imagenet is used as training data,
the epoch size is 200, batch number is 64, and the leading rate is
0.01. On the other hand, optimizer and loss function were used the
same as SGD optimizer and cross entropy.
Table 1: Distributed Learning and Non-Distributed learning
test results. Sharing means sharing part of the model as a
common extractor. On the contrary, non-sharingmeans not
sharing part of the model.
Dataset Client Accuracy(%)(sharing)
Accuracy(%)
(non-sharing)
Client1 99.18 98.84
Mnist Client2 99.22 98.62
Client3 98.57 98.60
Client1 92.97 92.02
Cifar10 Client2 94.50 92.20
Client3 97.83 95.40
Client1 68.50 73.50
Imagenet Client2 79.33 79.33
Client3 89.33 81.33
4.1.2 Distributed model performance result.
Table 1 shows the experimental results. e results in the table
compared the distributed ordering model that shared weight with
the model that did not share weight. For the mnist dataset, the
overall client-specic performance showed slightly higher perfor-
mance, although not large when the weight was shared. Similarly,
in ciar10 dataset, the accuracy of models that shared Weight and
those that did not share it was not signicantly dierent. Unlike
the previous two datasets, the non-sharing model had higher per-
formance with 68.50 and 73.50 accuracy for client1 in the case of
the Imagenet dataset.
Overall, there was no signicant dierence in accuracy depend-
ing on whether weight was shared or not. However, when looking
at the results of the Imagenet dataset, it was noted that the perfor-
mance was high when client1 did not share the weight, unlike the
accuracy of client2 and client3. Based on this, it was assumed that
simply averaging the weights was not eective. In other words, the
4
Figure 3: e reconstructed results of inversion attack depending on depth in split learning.
performance of the distributed learning model will depend on how
the weight of the common extractor is shared.
4.2 Inversion attack to common extractor
4.2.1 Experimental design.
We examine the eects of common extractor’s depth on reconstruc-
tion success. e measure of success is dened as the dierences
of pixels between input and reconstructed images, in Eq. 3. When
the dierences between input and reconstructed images are small,
then the reconstruction score indicate relatively high value.
ReconstructionScore = 1−1000∗(
N∑
i=1
(xi −x ′i )2)/N , xi ∈ R3 (3)
x indicates original image, x ′ indicates reconstructed image, and
N means the number of train samples. Using the reconstruction
score, we compared the reconstruction score when the depth of
common extractors are dier. ResNet50 consists of four main layers
and one classier. When spliing the resnet50 into two parts,
common extractor and others, we controlled the divided place,
which indicates depth of common extractor. For three common
extractors, which have dierent depth (layer1, layer2, and layer3 in
Fig. 3), reconstruction scores are compared.
4.2.2 Reconstruction results depending on layers’ depth.
When the depth of common extractor increased, the reconstruc-
tion score decreased in Fig. 3. Non-linear function such as ReLU,
convolution, and max pooling compressed the image information
by removing less informative features. Increased depth means the
increased number of non-linear function, which is irreversible to
removing huge amounts of information. In Fig. 3, the reconstruc-
tion score decreased almost linearly when the depth of common
extractor increased. ough the reconstruction score decreased, the
reconstructed result in split3 can be recognized as hands, insects,
mountain, and sea in background. erefore, additional privacy-
preserving method like dierential privacy is required to be merged
with our systems, which are our future plans.
5 CONCLUSION
In this experiment, we proposed a distribution deep learning model
to solve the privacy problem and the resource problem of local
clients. e model divides the training operation to be in charge
of the local client and the cloud server, and limits the transmied
and received data to the forward feature and backward gradient.
erefore, it is possible to utilize the resources of the cloud without
directly exposing the original data. To verify the model’s perfor-
mance, we conducted a test using mnist, cifar10, and imagenet data
sets. As a result, similar accuracy was obtained without signi-
cant gap in performance. However, the result of imagenet client1
showed a slightly dierent aspect, inferring that the weight shar-
ing method should be well designed. Also, we experimented with
how the layer depth of the common extractor aects information
security. As a result, it was conrmed that it became more dicult
to recover information as the layer depth became deeper. For the
more reliable privacy preserving system, we further research is to
apply dierential privacy in our system.
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